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Abstract In this paper, distribution and welfare effects of changes in block price systems
are evaluated. A method is discussed to determine, for a Marshallian demand function,
equivalent variation in case of a block price system. The method is applied to compare,
for the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, alternative pricing policies on the basis of their
demand, welfare and distribution effects of changing water prices. Results show that there is
a trade off between average welfare and income distribution. A pro-poor price system may
result in lower average welfare than a flat price system, but in higher individual welfare for
the poor. Moreover, there is a trade off between revenues for the water company and income
distribution. Even though pro-poor price systems may not be as good for average welfare as
flat price systems, their direct effects on poverty are important. Introducing pro-poor price
systems, however, may have financial consequences for the water companies.
Keywords Water demand · Equivalent variation · Social welfare · Income distribution
1 Introduction
A basic principle in economics is that in order to get efficient prices, they have to reflect
marginal costs. As a consequence, economic theory often recommends the application of
flat prices. However, for some goods, such as residential water and electricity, block pri-
cing systems are applied in many countries. Such pricing systems are said to be better for
income distribution as, in case of progressive block price systems, poor households who
consume less, pay lower average prices. A drawback of block pricing is, however, a poten-
tial welfare loss. Even though direct income transfers may lead to larger welfare increases
for poor consumers than in-kind subsidies of the same amount, many (especially public)
water suppliers employ block pricing systems as they not only try to promote efficiency
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but also have other objectives related to equity, cost recovery and local acceptability (Ar-
bués and Villanúa 2006). Moreover, particularly in developing countries, alternative systems
for improving social security, like transfers through income taxes, do not function properly.
Comparisons between the welfare and distribution effects of alternative pricing systems are
rare in the literature as the methods to derive the welfare effects are not straightforward.
Next to that, as so many public utilities do apply or are thinking of applying block tariffs,
getting more insights into the welfare and distributional effects of alternative pricing systems
is necessary.
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to discuss how distribution and welfare effects
of changes in block price systems can be analyzed. A method is discussed with which for
a known, linear Marshallian demand function, equivalent variation of a change in the block
price system can be determined. This method extends existing methods used for deriving
equivalent variation on the basis of Marshallian demand curves so that they are applicable
for block pricing systems. The method is used to compare for the Metropolitan Area of
São Paulo alternative pricing policies on the basis of their water demand, distribution and
welfare effects. It will especially be discussed whether the additional information obtained on
individual equivalent variation and social welfare may affect the ranking of alternative price
instruments. Note that a partial equilibrium approach is adopted and that indirect welfare
effects of changes in pricing policies are not considered.
An extensive literature exists on welfare measurement (see e.g. Slesnick 1998 for an
overview). The correct measure to use for determining welfare effects of price changes are
Hicks’ measures of Compensating Variation or Equivalent Variation. Most papers dealing
with this issue concentrate on determining compensating or equivalent variation in case of
a linear budget line. Those considering block price systems especially focus on effects of
labor taxation (see e.g. Hausman 1980). A recent paper using a comparable, but slightly
different methodology and price system is Reiss and White (2006), who estimate welfare
effects of non-linear price systems for mobile phone services. They, however, concentrate
on compensating variation, whereas it is argued in the current paper that equivalent variation
should be applied if alternative price policies are ranked. Compensating variation may result
in biased results. For the case of water, there is an extensive literature on the estimation of
residential water demand functions (see e.g Arbués et al. 2003 for an overview). Moreover,
there is a growing literature on the use of panel data methods to estimate demand under a block
price system (see e.g. Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Arbués and Villanúa 2006; Olmstead et al.
2007). Only few studies concentrate on the analysis of welfare effects of block price changes.
Renzetti (1992) and García-Valiñas (2005) analyzed welfare effects of reforming water price
systems, but they concentrated on the use of the optimal price theory using Ramsey prices
which is not the focus of the current paper. Rietveld et al. (2000) for the case of Indonesia
and Hajispyrou et al. (2002) for the case of Cyprus are two of the few studies focusing on
the welfare effects of block price systems for residential water use. They, however, analyzed
welfare effects of a price system changing from a block price into a flat price system. A novel
element of the current paper is that especially the more complex case of changes within the
block price system are analyzed in order to be able to assess the effects on both welfare and
income distribution.
In this paper, in Sect. 2, a method is discussed to determine on the basis of the Marshallian
demand function the equivalent variation and social welfare in case of a block price system.
In Sect. 3, a linear water demand function is estimated for the Metropolitan Region of
São Paulo which is used in Sect. 4 to analyze the welfare and distribution effects of changes
in the price system. Finally, in Sect. 5 a number of conclusions are drawn.
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2 Marshallian Demand and Equivalent Variation
As stated above, the correct measure to use for determining welfare effects of price changes
are Hicks’ compensating or equivalent variation. Compensating Variation (CV) measures
‘the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after
the price change as she was before the price change’ (Hausman 1981, p. 662). Equivalent
Variation (EV), on the other hand, measures the ‘amount the consumer would be indifferent
about accepting in lieu of the price change’ (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 82). CV is based
on ex-ante utility and EV on ex-post utility. In applied economics, however, an often used
measure for welfare changes is consumer surplus. It measures the consumer’s willingness
to pay for a price change on the basis of the Marshallian demand function instead of the
Hicksian demand function. Use of the Marshallian demand function is much easier as it
is directly observable in practice, and therefore can be estimated on the basis of observed
demand data. A drawback, however, is that it does not compensate for income effects of price
changes, which are taken into account in the Hicksian demand function. Consumer surplus
equals compensating variation only under specific circumstances. Willig (1976) argued that
in most cases the differences between both welfare measures are small and therefore use of
consumer surplus is an appropriate approximation of welfare changes. Others, however, show
that these differences may be substantial. Making a choice between both welfare measures,
however, is not necessary as Hausman (1981) and Vartia (1983) showed that indirect utility
and therefore compensating and equivalent variation can be determined on the basis of the
Marshallian demand function. Both methods are based on linear budget constraints. In the
case of kinked budget curves and especially in the case of non-convex budget curves, things
change.
In this paper, the method developed by Hausman (1981) is extended in order to derive
equivalent and compensating variation in a situation with a non-convex budget set. Such
a situation often applies for example in labor markets (see e.g. Hausman 1985). Similar
situations also apply for electricity and water markets where progressive block price systems
are combined with a high first block price (or a fixed fee) to account for fixed cost. In this
section, I first briefly discuss the concept of equivalent and compensating variation, which
of the two concepts should be used for ranking alternative policies and how it can be derived
on the basis of the Marshallian demand function. Secondly, this method is extended for a
situation with a convex kinked budget curve. Thirdly, it is discussed how to deal with non-
convex budget sets. Finally, using some of the elements discussed before, a measure for
social welfare is discussed that can be used to assess the social welfare effects of block price
changes.
Consider a two-good situation in which the second good, which can be interpreted as
an aggregate commodity, is the numeraire whose price is held constant. The price vector is
defined as p = (p, 1). The price of the first commodity p and income y are normalized
with respect to the price of the second commodity and both commodities are assumed to be
separable. At price p0 = (p0, 1) and income level y0, demand is equal to x0 = (x0, x ′0) and
utility to u0(x0) (see Fig. 1). If the price of commodity 1 decreases to p1, the budget line
shifts outwards and becomes flatter. The equivalent income, the income the consumer would
need to be as well off without as with the price decrease, is equal to ye. Equivalent variation
is defined as ye − y0. The compensating income, the income the consumer would need to be
as well off with as without the price change, is equal to yc. Compensating variation is defined
as y0 − yc. Both income measures are used as a money metric indirect utility function. In
case of a price increase EV and CV are equal to the welfare loss, whereas they are the welfare
gain in case of a price reduction. The expenditure function at a given level of utility u0 and
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of Compensating Variation (Panel a) and Equivalent Variation (Panel b)
price p = (p, 1) is defined as e(p, uo) = minx { p · x |u(x) ≥ u0 } . 1 Using this, EV and
CV of a price change from p0 to p1 are defined as
EV (p0, p1, y0) = e (p0, u1) − e (p1, u1) = e (p0, u1) − y0
CV (p0, p1, y0) = e (p0, u0) − e (p1, u0) = y0 − e (p1, u0) (1)
The first question is which of the two measures to use. Chipman and Moore (1980) and
Mas-Colell et al. (1995) showed that not CV, but only EV can be used for ranking alternative
policies with different price vectors. The reason is that in CV, the money metric indirect
utility levels are based on new prices and initial utility, whereas in EV, they reflect the new
utility levels that will be obtained with the new prices. 2
The second question is how to derive from the Marshallian demand function the corres-
ponding expenditure function. For a linear Marshallian demand function, Hausman (1981)
showed that the expenditure function can be derived by using Roy’s identity and the de-
finition of the indirect utility function. Introduce a linear Marshallian demand function
x(p, y) = αp + βy + γ z′ with coefficients α and β, row vector of coefficients γ , and
the vector of other variables affecting demand z. Moreover, introduce the indirect utility
function
V (p, y) = max {u(x) | p · x ≤ y } (2)
1 For simplicity, in the definitions of the expenditure function e(p, u0), demand function x(p, y), indirect
utility function V (p, y), equivalent variation EV (·) and compensating variation CV (·), only the price p of
the first commodity is mentioned as the price of the second commodity is held constant.
2 In case a price p0 is compared with prices p1 and p2, the difference in equivalent variation between both
prices is EV (p0, p1, y0) − EV (p0, p2, y0) = e (p0, u1) − e (p0, u2) and the difference in compensating
variation is CV (p0, p1, y0) − CV (p0, p2, y0) = e (p2, u0) − e (p1, u0). Chipman and Moore (1980)
proved that if income does not change if prices change and if preferences are homothetic, CV (p0, p1, y0) >
CV (p0, p2, y0) if p1 < p2 and CV will rank the different policies correctly. If this assumption does not
apply, however, CV not necessarily ranks p1 and p2 correctly but EV will (see also Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
p. 86). As will be discussed below, in the case analyzed in this paper income does change if the block price
changes due to a change in implicit subsidy received by the consumers if prices change and therefore EV
should be used to rank alternative policies.
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and Roy’s identity according to which
x(p, y) = −∂V (p, y)/∂p
∂V (p, y)/∂y
(3)
For the linear demand function, (3) gives a differential equation for which Hausman (1981)
proved that the indirect utility function V (p, y) has the following form
V (p, y) = exp(−βp)
[
y + 1
β
(
αp + α
β
+ γ z′
)]
(4)
It can easily be shown that this function satisfies the integrability conditions as it is conti-
nuous, quasi-convex in p, homogeneous of degree zero in p and y and non increasing in p.
Homogeneity of degree zero in p and y follows directly from the assumption that both p and
y are deflated by the price of the other good which is by assumption equal to 1. This proves
that the linear demand function follows from a rational preference relation (Mas-Colell et al.
1995). 3 By substituting in (4) income y by expenditures e(p, u) and V (p, y) by u, the
corresponding expenditure function follows
e(p, u) = u exp(βp) − 1
β
(
αp + α
β
+ γ z′
)
(5)
As a consequence, using (4) and (5), EV in (1) can easily be calculated if the Marshallian
demand function is known.
Let us now turn to the question how to determine equivalent variation in case of a kinked
budget curve. Consider for the moment for commodity 1 a two-tiered block price system
with block prices pb = (p1, p2) ,with pi the price in block i and in which price jumps from
p1 to p2 if demand exceeds x¯ (see Fig. 2). Assume for the moment a convex budget set with
p1 ≤ p2. Note that still the price of the second commodity is equal to 1, so that the price
vector for the two commodities is p = ( pb, 1). For this situation, equivalent variation for a
price change from pb0 to p
b
1 is, just as in (1), defined as
EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) = eb ( pb0 , u1) − y0 (6)
3 In this paper, a linear demand function is adopted. We make the assumption of implicit separability which
justifies a demand curve with only one price (Arbués et al. 2004) and due to which the quasi indirect utility
function (based only on the single good demand curve) can easily be derived and gives the same measure
of equivalent variation as the actual, many good, indirect utility function (Hausman 1981). Regularly, linear
demand functions are criticized as they would only apply for restrictive assumptions on the preference ordering.
Given the assumptions made above, however, it is shown that in our situation this does not pose any problems
(see e.g. Hausman 1981; LaFrance 1985; Arbués et al. 2004; Beattie and LaFrance 2006). Linear demand
functions are also criticized as they imply a choke price for which demand is zero (Al-Qunaibet and Johnston
1985), which is inconsistent with water being a necessary good and due to which e.g. a log–log function may
be more appropriate. On the other hand, linear demand also implies a satiation level at low prices, which is
intuitively correct (Arbués et al. 2004) and which would not follow from a log–log demand function. In much
of the empirical literature, functional forms are chosen that best fit the available data, without considering the
underlying preference structures or related utility function. In the empirical analysis on water demand, the
linear demand function is applied very often and for a study in Spain, Arbués and Villanúa (2006) show that
the linear demand function is the most appropriate functional form. Next to that, also other forms are regularly
adopted, like e.g. the log–log demand function which has the additional advantage that elasticities are fixed
(Olmstead et al. 2007). However, there is no theoretical evidence that any of the functional forms would be
best. Moreover, it can be argued that the demand function does not have to be linear over the full range of
prices, as long as it is (approximately) linear over the range of prices considered. It is left for future research to
find out how deriving Equivalent Variation in case of a kinded budget curve would change if other functional
forms were chosen.
123
166 A. Ruijs
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of EV in case of a kinked budget curve. Expenditures in case of a kinked
budget curve if xe and x1 are at segment 2 of the budget curve (Panel a), xe and x1 are at the kink (Panel b),
xe is at the kink and x1 at segment 1 of the budget curve (Panel c), and xe is at the kink and x1 at segment 2
of the budget curve (Panel d)
with eb
(
pb0 , u1
)
the expenditures in case of a block price system. These expenditures reflect
the income needed to reach a utility level u1 if the price vector is
(
pb0 , 1
)
. Call xe the demand
level at which there is tangency between the indifference curve u1 = V
(
pb1 , y0
)
and the
kinked budget curve characterised by prices
(
pb0 , 1
)
and income eb
(
pb0 , u1
) (for an exact
derivation of u1, see the Appendix). The definition of eb
(
pb0 , u1
)
depends on the segment
of the budget line on which xe is located. Three different cases can be distinguished: xe is at
the first segment of the budget curve, at the second segment, or at the kink. Hausman (1985)
proved that in case of a convex budget set and a quasi-concave utility function, there is a
unique level of xe, so that only one of the three cases will apply. First, consider the situation
if xe is at the first segment of the budget curve. In that case, the situation is like in Panel (a)
of Fig. 1 and the expenditures are like in (5) with p substituted by p10. In other words,
eb
(
pb0 , u1
) = e (p10, u1) if x (p10, e (p10, u1)) ≤ x¯ (7)
and in that case EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) = e (p10, u1) − y0, see (6). Note that for this situation
xe = x
(
p10, e
(
p10, u1
))
.
Secondly, if xe is at the second segment, as in Panel (a) in Fig. 2, the expenditure function is
different. In that case expenditures eb
(
pb0 , u1
)
are not determined by substituting p20 in (5), as
an amount
(
p20 − p10
)
x¯ less is needed to purchase the quantity xe. The expenditures e(p20, u1),
as determined by (5), are also called virtual expenditures. They are the expenditures necessary
to purchase xe if the price were p20 throughout and utility is u1. Using this, for a block
price system pb0 =
(
p10, p
2
0
)
, expenditures to purchase xe are eb
(
pb0 , u1
) = e (p20, u1) −(
p20 − p10
)
x¯ . In this definition,
(
p20 − p10
)
x¯ is an implicit subsidy for consumers in block 2.
It is the difference between expenditures if p20 were the price and the actual expenditures in
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the block price system. It follows that if prices change from pb0 =
(
p10, p
2
0
)
to pb1 =
(
p11, p
2
1
)
,
expenditures are equal to
eb
(
pb0 , u1
) = e (p20, u1) − (p20 − p10) x¯ if x (p20, e (p20, u1)) ≥ x¯ (8)
and in that case EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) = e (p20, u1) − (p20 − p10) x¯ − y0, see (6). 4 For this case
xe = x
(
p20, e
(
p20, u1
))
. Note that a change from a flat to a block pricing system or from a
block to a flat price system is a special case of the method discussed above in which for the
flat price system p1 = p2.
Thirdly, if xe is at the kink, xe = x¯ , the situation is more complex (see Panel (b)–
(d) in Fig. 2). This situation happens if tangency with the indifference curve is at a point
x
(
p10, e
(
p10, u1
))
> x¯ for the budget line with slope p10 and at a point x
(
p20, e
(
p20, u1
))
< x¯
for the budget curve with slope p20. The question is how to derive the price p¯ and virtual
income y¯ = e( p¯, u1) for which preferred demand would be x¯ . How p¯ and e ( p¯, u1) look like
depends on whether the demand level after the price change, x1, is at the kink or in one of the
segments of the budget curve. If demand x1 and xe are at the kink, the method is simple (see
Panel (b) of Fig. 2). In that case, for demand for commodity 2, the numeraire, it has to hold that
x¯ ′ = y0 − p11 x¯ = eb
(
pb0 , u1
)− p10 x¯ . It directly follows that eb ( pb0 , u1) = y0 + (p10 − p11) x¯
and that equivalent variation is
EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) = (p10 − p11) x¯ (9)
If demand level x1 is in block i and demand level xe is at the kink (see Panel (c) and (d) in
Fig. 2), the method is more complex. In that case, the virtual equivalent income y¯ = e( p¯, u1)
and price p¯ for which demand would be x¯ can be determined by using the demand functions
x¯ = α p¯ + β y¯ + γ z′ and x1 = αpi1 + β y˜i0 + γ z′ and by the fact that it has to hold that
V
(
pi1, y˜
i
0
) = V ( p¯, y¯), with y˜10 = y0 if demand x1 = x (p11, y0) is at segment 1 and
y˜20 = y0 +
(
p21 − p11
)
x¯ if demand x1 = x
(
p21, y0 +
(
p21 − p11
)
x¯
)
is at segment 2. Using the
indirect utility function (4) it follows that for the linear demand function
p¯ = pi1 +
1
β
ln
(
x¯ + α
β
x1 + αβ
)
e ( p¯, u1) = y¯ = 1
β
(
x¯ − α p¯ − γ z′) = y˜i0 + 1β (x¯ − x1) −
α
β2
ln
(
x¯ + α
β
x1 + αβ
)
eb
(
pb0 , u1
) = e ( p¯, u1) − ( p¯ − p10) x¯
(10)
This gives an equivalent variation of
EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) = (p10 − p11) x¯ − 1β
(
x¯ + α
β
)
ln
(
x¯ + α
β
x1 + αβ
)
+ 1
β
(x¯ − x1) (11)
Note that (9) and (11) are the same if x1 = x¯ .
In case of an n-tiered block price system, the methods discussed above slightly differ.
Assume a situation with n block prices, pb = (p1, . . . , pn) with block frontiers equal to
x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯n), so that for x¯ i−1 < x < x¯ i the price is equal to pi . Note that x¯0 = 0 and
4 Note that due to the implicit subsidy if demand is in block 2, the demand function x = αp2 + β(y + (p2 −
p1)x¯) + γ z′ is equal to x = (α + β x¯)p2 + β(y − p1 x¯) + γ z′. As a result, the price elasticity of demand
changes (see also Olmstead et al. 2007). As usually α < 0 and β > 0, it is in theory possible that α +β x¯ > 0,
meaning that, perversely, demand increases if the marginal price increases. In this case, the income effect of a
move between two consumption blocks is larger than the price effect. In practice this is usually not a problem.
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x¯n = ∞. If demand is in block 1 , the usual definition of expenditures is used. If demand is
in block i > 1, equivalent variation for a change from pb0 to p
b
1 is defined as
EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) =
⎡
⎣e (pi0, u1
)
−
i−1∑
j=1
(
p j+10 − p j0
)
x¯ j
⎤
⎦ − y0 (12)
If x1 is at kink or segment l and xe is at kink i, xe = x¯ i , equivalent variation is
EV
(
pb0 , p
b
1 , y0
) =
⎡
⎣e ( p¯, u1) −
(
p¯ − pi0
)
x¯ i −
i−1∑
j=1
(
p j+10 − p j0
)
x¯ j
⎤
⎦ − y0
=
(
pi0 − pl1
)
x¯ i −
i−1∑
j=1
(
p j+10 − p j0
)
x¯ j +
l−1∑
j=1
(
p j+11 − p j1
)
x¯ j
− 1
β
(
x¯ i + α
β
)
ln
(
x¯ i + α
β
x1 + αβ
)
+ 1
β
(
x¯ i − x1
)
(13)
The last term at the right-hand side of (12) and the last two terms at the right hand side of
the first line of (13) are equal to the implicit subsidy the consumer receives. It is equal to the
difference between what the consumer would pay if the only price were price pi0 or p¯ and
the expenditures in the block price system. In the water demand and electricity literature, this
term is usually defined as the difference variable and is first introduced by Nordin (1976).
The final element to be discussed deals with how to determine the segment at which
optimal utility is obtained in case of a non-convex budget set. This method is taken from
Hausman (1985). In case of a convex budget curve the method is as discussed above. For
each segment i of the budget curve, it is determined what will be demand if the marginal
price were block price pi . Demand lies on segment i if x¯ i−1 < x(pi , y˜i ) ≤ x¯ i . In case
of a convex budget set and a quasi concave utility function, this procedure results in the
unique utility optimizing demand level (Hausman 1985). In the non-convex case, however,
which applies for example in case of a (partly) regressive block price system, a unique
optimum no longer necessarily exists as the indifference curves can be tangent to multiple
segments of the budget curve. Information about the utility or indirect utility function has
to be known to find the utility maximizing demand level. If this information is known, the
non-convex budget set can be subdivided into a finite number of convex subsets, numbered
j = 1, . . . , J . So, the set of segments I = {1, . . . , n} can be subdivided into J subsets
I j =
{
i j−1 + 1, . . . , i j
}
, with i0 = 0 and i j = n. For each convex subset j and i I j ,
the optimal demand level x j (pi , y˜i ), and corresponding price pi and indirect utility level
Vj (pi , y˜i ) can be derived by using the method described above, in which virtual income
y˜i = y0 + ∑i−1j=1 (p j+1 − p j ) x¯ j . The overall optimal demand level can be determined
by choosing the price pi and demand x(pi , y˜i ) corresponding to the segment yielding the
highest indirect utility: V ∗ = max(V1, . . . , Vj ). For the linear demand function, Vj (pi , y˜i )
is equal to (4).
For a given individual demand function, the measure of equivalent variation as discussed
above gives the per capita welfare effects of price changes. This is very useful for evaluating
distributional effects of price changes. It is, however, less suitable for ranking alternative price
systems as that includes weighin tradeoffs between different income groups. For determining
the overall impact of a price change, it is possible to follow a utilitarian social welfare approach
and just aggregate the individual effects. However, in that case effects on the poor have the
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same weights as effects on the rich. An often applied measure that addresses the aggregation
problem and takes into consideration inequality aversion is the Atkinson measure of social
welfare. For given income levels yk , k = 1, . . . , K , for each individual, social welfare is
written as (see e.g. Atkinson 1970; Deaton 1997; Slesnick 1998)
W = 1
K
K∑
k=1
y1−ρk
1 − ρ (14)
with ρ > 0 an indicator controlling for the degree of inequality aversion in which ρ = 0
yields a utilitarian social welfare function and ρ = ∞ yields a Rawlsian maximin welfare
function (Slesnick 1998). Usually for ρ a value between 0 and 2 is chosen. 5 Which value of
ρ should be adopted is a political question, which is not further discussed here. In this paper,
it will only be assessed to what extent a different value of ρ affects the ranking of alternative
price systems.
To apply this measure for analyzing the social welfare effects of price changes, an income
measure should be adopted that properly measures the income change that is equivalent to the
welfare effect of a price change. For this, the measure of equivalent income is an appropriate
measure.6 Equivalent income is the income that an individual would need before the price
change (at price pb0 ) to have the post-change utility level
(
u
(
pb1 , y0
))
, i.e. ye = eb
(
pb0 , u1
)
as defined in (7), (8) and (10). This gives the necessary ingredients to derive social welfare
for a given value of inequality aversion ρ.
3 Water Demand in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo
The Brazilian Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP) is one of the most densely popula-
ted areas in the world, housing more than 25 million people. The MRSP houses 50% of the
state’s population whereas it only occupies 2.7% of its territory. The MRSP regularly suffers
from water shortage. As a result, SABESP, the main energy, water resources and sanitation
secretary of the MRSP, has to ration water distribution. SABESP applies a five-tiered, non-
convex block price system in which between 1997 and 2002 the prices from block 2 to 5 were
on average p2 = 0.41, p3 = 1.43, p4 = 2.04 and p5 = 2.26 Real/m3 for consumption quan-
tities ranging from 10–20, 20–30, 30–50 and higher than 50 m3 per month per connection,
respectively. In that period, the price of the first 10 m3 was on average p1 = 2.56 Real/m3,
which included the fixed costs. This system assures a safe minimum level of revenues for the
water company, but may for the poorer population result in high average prices and relatively
high expenses. Note that due to this price system, the budget constraint is non-convex. 7
A connection contained on average 6.01 people. Comparable systems are applied in other
Latin American cities (Walker et al. 2000).
5 Note that for ρ > 1 social welfare levels W become negative which can be prevented by a simple linear
transformation.
6 Note that the measure of compensating income, as is used for determining CV (yc = eb( pb1 , u0)), is not an
appropriate measure as it gives the income necessary to stay at the same utility level as before a price change
from pb0 to p
b
1 . The problem is that compensating income yc reduces if the price reduces whereas welfare
increases in that case.
7 Note that for this case, the budget curve can easily be transformed into a convex budget curve. As the frontier
of the first block is below subsistence level, all consumers will consume more than 10 m3 due to which the
costs for the first block can be interpreted as a fixed charge and the unit cost for the first block are not relevant
as marginal price. This results in a horizontal section in the budget line. As a result, the budget line is kinky
but convex. This doesn’t change anything to the method as discussed above or the results as presented below.
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In the past, much has been written about estimating water demand functions in a block
price system (see e.g. Arbués et al. 2003 and Arbués and Villanúa 2006 for an overview). Even
though using micro-level data is preferred for estimating water demand functions, only few
papers actually use it due to the difficulty of obtaining these data (see e.g. Nieswiadomy and
Molina 1989; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Arbués et al. 2004; Arbués and Villanúa 2006;
Olmstead et al. 2007). With micro-data, the discrete/continuous choice model as proposed by
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Olmstead et al. (2007) could be applied, which specifically
models the choice of consumption block, or a dynamic panel data method like in Arbués et al.
(2004) and Arbués and Villanúa (2006). Similar to most papers focusing on water demand
estimation, for the MRSP only aggregate data were available and, therefore, the estimates are
based on these aggregate data. Besides a number of econometric estimation issues, demand
functions can depend on average or on marginal prices, depending on how well consumers
are informed about the block price system applied. According to Taylor (1975), price jumps
caused by the movement to another block have an income effect due to which a demand
function depending only on the marginal price is theoretically incorrect. For that reason,
Nordin (1976) introduced a difference variable, accounting for the difference between the
costs of water consumption if the marginal price were the only price and the true costs
under the block price system. Its effect is hypothesized to be of the same magnitude as the
income effect. Different empirical studies (see e.g. Billings and Agthe 1980; Chicoine and
Ramamurthy 1986), however, have shown that the effect of a consumption related subsidy
may be different from the income effect. This may be because consumers are not well
informed, because the difference variable is small relative to income or because of estimation
biases. A much cited comment on the use of marginal prices is that many people are not well
informed and that therefore a demand model based on average prices is more realistic. To test
for whether the marginal or average price model is superior, Opaluch (1982, 1984) proposed a
model with a decomposed measure of average and marginal price. It is an empirical question
which demand model is most appropriate.
For estimating a water demand function for the MRSP, aggregate data were used on
monthly water consumption, number of connections, block prices and water rationing for the
period July 1997–December 2002 obtained from SABESP for the consumers from 39 muni-
cipalities covering almost the entire MRSP (data were available for a period of 64 months).
Prices were deflated using the Brazilian price index IPCA/IBGE, which is available on a
monthly basis. Differences between minimum and maximum price observations are about
16% for p2, . . . , p5 and 31% for the price of block 1. In the data set, average consumption per
household (total residential consumption divided by the number of connections) was always
in the third consumption block. Although individual households may be in different consump-
tion blocks, depending on income and other household variables, average consumption was
in block 3 in all periods. Therefore, as only aggregate consumption data were available,
p3 is interpreted as the marginal price of household water consumption. Moreover, income
data for the period 1996–2003 was obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (PNAD/IBGE) which were deflated using the Brazilian price index IPCA/IBGE,
population data from the State Data Analysis System Foundation (SEADE) and monthly data
on rainfall and temperature from the Institute of Atmosphere and Geography (IAG). For a
more elaborate discussion of the data, see Ruijs et al. (2008).
Using these data, Ruijs et al. (2008) estimated the following marginal price, water demand
function: xt = αpt+βyt+δdt+ γ zt ′+t , with pt , yt and dt price in block 3 (p3), income and
difference variable and zt a vector with rainfall, temperature, rationing, lagged consumption,
lagged rainfall and the intercept and t the error term. Using the approach of Opaluch (1982),
it was estimated whether the marginal or average price model should be used, but based on
123
Welfare and Distribution Effects of Water Pricing Policies 171
the results neither of the methods could be rejected. Moreover, in this model, the coefficient
δ of the difference variable was notably different from the income coefficient β, as observed
in a number of other empirically estimated demand functions. In the current paper, a new
function is estimated in which it is assumed that the income effect is equal to the effect of
changes in the difference variable. As argued above, it is still under debate whether these
effects should be similar or not. Even though some empirical studies show that the effects
are different, allowing for differences in these coefficients is theoretically debatable and next
to that, it would make the method discussed in Sect. 2 incorrect (see also Hausman 1981).
After all, in that case it would have to be assumed that virtual income is not equal to income
plus the difference variable, but smaller or larger, depending on the relation between β and δ.
For that reason, the function estimated is
xt = αpt + β(yt + dit ) + µxt−1 + γ z′t + t (15)
in which dit =
∑i−1
j=1(p j+1 − p j )x¯ j , see (12), if demand is in block i . Lagged consumption
was included as it can be expected that people show a delay in the change of their behavior
if prices change, especially if payments are made after consumption. The model was solved
using OLS. As in the aggregate data all observations reflected consumption in the third
consumption block, simultaneity which is caused by the endogenous relation between price
and consumption in a block price system, was not a problem and it was not necessary to
use instrumental variable techniques (see e.g. Arbués and Villanúa 2006). In the estimation,
observations with studentized residuals exceeding ±2.8 were removed, leaving 63 of the 64
observations. Next to that, heteroscedasticity was tested for, normality of residuals was tested
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and for testing serial correlation the Durbin-H test was
used. 8 Results are presented in Table 1.9
The coefficient signs are as expected. Higher prices, more rainfall and more rationing lead
to a reduced demand, whereas higher income and higher temperatures result in an increase of
demand. Higher temperatures or less precipitation will induce people to take more showers,
do the laundry more often, water the garden more often and use the swimming pool more
often. Note that (15) can be interpreted as the short run demand function in which demand
depends on the given demand from the previous period. Short run preferences depend upon
policies and price levels from the past. In the longer run preferences may change due to
changes in (price) policies. The long run demand function can be defined as
xt = (αpt + β(yt + dit ) + γ z′t + t )/(1 − µ) (16)
In this specification it is assumed that price changes result in demand adjustments without any
lags. Even though this is inconsistent with the empirical specification of partial adjustment, it
8 For testing serial correlation, the Durbin Watson test can not be used as it is biased towards 2 when a lagged
variable is included. For that reason, the Durbin-H test was used. This test statistic is asymptotically distributed
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis that there is no additional serial correlation. It can be closely approximated
using the Durban Watson test statistic, using the following formula: h = r · (√n/ (1 − n · var (µ))) with
r  1 − d/2, d the Durbin Watson test statistic, var (µ) = (µ/tµ)2, n the sample size and tµ the t-ratio
for coefficient µ. For this case, h = 1.833 which is not rejected at the 5 percent significance level (see e.g.
Johnston 1984).
9 Next to the linear model, also a number of other functional forms were estimated, including a log–log
demand function in which the logarithm of demand is a function of the logarithms of price and virtual income.
The results of these estimates did not give any evidence why e.g the log–log model would be better than the
linear model. As there is no theoretical evidence why a particular functional form should be adopted (see also
Footnote 3), the linear function is used here. Adapting the method discussed in Sect. 2 for other functional
forms is left for future research. Next to that, also additional linear models with more lagged variables were
estimated. The estimated coefficients, however, were not significant.
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Table 1 Regression estimates of per capita water demand (m3/month/person)
Descriptives Water demand
Mean Stand. Dev. Coefficient t-Statistic
Intercept 2.2805 2.8114∗∗
Pricea 1.43 0.05 −0.5858 −1.7577∗
Virtual incomeb 744.23 25.74 0.0011 2.2590∗∗
Timec −0.0040 −3.3694∗∗
Temperatured 19.55 2.57 0.0477 7.2488∗∗
Rainfalle 118.30 90.94 −0.0004 −2.5994∗∗
Rationingf 0.26 0.44 −0.0895 −3.1419∗∗
Lagged consumptiong 0.2928 3.3648∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.820 Durbin-H test 1.833
F-Statistic 42.015 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 0.815
Sample size 63
Notes: ∗ Significant at 10% level, ∗∗ Significant at 5% level, a Real/m3, b Real/month/person, c Month, d ◦C,
e mm/month, f n = 0, yes = 1, g m3/month/person
is a convenient way of making demand independent from past policies and preferences (see
e.g. LaFrance and de Gorter 1985). The price and income elasticities of demand, computed at
the mean price and income values, are for the short run demand function equal to −0.20 and
0.19, respectively, and for the long run demand function equal to −0.28 and 0.28, respectively.
Water demand is inelastic and elasticities are rather low but within the ranges mentioned in
many other studies reporting price elasticities of demand ranging between −0.05 and −0.75
and income elasticities ranging between 0.05 and 0.50 with a few studies reporting elasticities
exceeding 1 or even 2 (Dalhuisen and Nijkamp 2001; Arbués et al. 2003; Olmstead et al.
2007). As expected, long run demand elasticities are a bit less inelastic as consumers adjust
their behavior to changing price and income levels.
4 Scenario Analysis
To illustrate the value of the additional information obtained with the method discussed
above, the distribution and welfare effects of changes in block pricing systems in the MRSP
on different income groups are analyzed, using the short and long run demand function
estimated above (see 15 and 16). Demand changes, average prices, water bills, equivalent
variation and social welfare are determined for a number of price systems for five income
groups in order to explore the effects of price changes. Extrapolating the demand function
to other income groups may result in biased estimates of real demand and welfare effects,
especially for the poorest and richest income groups. The analysis could be more detailed
if micro data were available. The analysis, however, will still give a good illustration of the
method discussed above. Moreover, it will give a good indication of the importance of getting
more information on income distribution effects of alternative price policies and the effects
it has on the ranking of these alternatives. Due to the possible biases for the poorest and
richest, however, the exact values of the results should be interpreted with care, even though
it is not expected that the direction of change, the ranking of the price systems or the general
observations made, will alter if more detailed data were available.
Using data on income distribution for the MRSP for the year 2000 (Minnesota Population
Center 2006), average income is determined for five income quintiles, which is used to
calculate their demand and average price (see Table 2). The average expenses on water
as percentage of income are in line with data from the Brazilian Institute for Geography
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Table 2 Yearly per capita income, per capita demand, water bill and average price per income quintile for
the short and long run demand functions
Income Per capita Per capita Water bill Average Water bill as
quintilea income demand (Real/year) price % of income
(Real/year) (m3/year)b (Real/m3)c
S.R.d L.R.d S.R. L.R. S.R. L.R. S.R. L.R.
1 1,257 42 40 63 60 1.48 1.48 4.98 4.75
2 2,601 44 41 65 61 1.48 1.48 2.49 2.35
3 4,361 46 44 68 64 1.48 1.48 1.55 1.48
4 7,751 49 49 73 72 1.47 1.47 0.94 0.93
5 28,753 68 75 105 120 1.54 1.59 0.37 0.42
Average 8,945 50 50 75 75 1.49 1.51 0.83 0.84
a Quintile 1 corresponds to the 20% of the population having the lowest income, Quintile 5 corresponds to
the 20% of the population having the highest income. Income shares are 2.81%, 5.82%, 9.75%, 17.33% and
64.29% for income Quintile 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Income shares are for 2000, Source: Minnesota
Population Center (2006)
b Consumers of Quintile 1, 2, 3 and 4 have a monthly consumption per connection in block 3. Consumers of
Quintile 5 have a consumption in block 5
c Average price = water bill/demand
d S.R. = Based on short run demand function (15); L.R. = Based on long run demand function (16)
and Statistics (IBGE 2003), which report for the MRSP water expenses as part of total
expenses to be on average 0.77%. The differences between the poor and richer parts of the
population, however, are considerable. Where the poorest 20% of the consumers spend on
average almost 5% of their income on a consumption of 40–42 m3 per year, the richest part
of the population spends only about 0.4% of their income on a consumption of 68–75 m3 per
person per year. The richest consumers have a consumption in block 4, whereas the others
have their consumption in block 3. The poorest population has a consumption in block 2 in
some months. Average prices do not show a stepwise increase for the first four quintiles. So,
although it is often claimed that a block price system is good for the poor, this can not be
concluded for the current system in the MRSP which has a progressive price system only from
the second till the fifth block and a very high price in the first block. Although average prices
may show a slight progression, the water bill as a % of income for the poorest consumers
is more than 14 times higher than for the richest consumers and still 5 times higher than for
the consumers in the fourth income quintile. Comparing the short run and long run results
shows that in the longer run the poorer population consumes less whereas the richer consume
more. The price effect becomes stronger in the longer run but this is moderated slightly by
the income effect. For the richest consumers, the income effect is stronger than the price
effect, resulting in higher demand.
In a scenario analysis, it is investigated for two types of scenarios and using the long
run demand function what will be the distributional effects of introducing alternative pricing
mechanisms (see Tables 3 and 4). In the first scenario, a number of block price or block size
changes are compared for which the welfare effects for the median consumer are negligible
(i.e. for which EV = 0 for the consumers in block 3). In the second scenario, a number of
block price changes are compared which are budget neutral for the water company, as results
from the first scenario show that their revenues may change substantially. These scenarios
correspond to policy guidelines regularly applied by policy makers if policy changes are
proposed, and which will especially be important if public utilities are reorganized. Note
that the exact levels of the policies depend, of course, on the exacts values of the model
parameters, but that the types of policies discussed here are examples of policies that are
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regularly considered by decision makers. Remember that a partial equilibrium approach is
adopted in which the indirect welfare effects of water suppliers’ deficits or of changes in
expenditures are not considered. An alternative and potentially interesting scenario would be
the application of optimal nonlinear pricing (see e.g. Feldstein 1972; Renzetti 1992; Anderson
2004). As cost data necessary for this are not available, this aspect is kept for future research.10
The following scenarios are analyzed.
1. Block changes resulting in a zero welfare effect for the median consumer.
(a) Decrease p1 with 15%, increase p2 and p3 with 85% and do not change p4
and p5.
(b) Introduce a progressive block price system with p1 = 1, p2 = 1.945, p3 =
2.60, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3.
(c) Introduce a flat price system with p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5= 1.481 Real/m3.
(d) Decrease p1 with 15% only for the consumers of income Quintile 1, 2 and 3,
increase p2 and p3 with 85% for all consumers and do not change p4 and p5.
(e) Keep the prices at their base level but change the block structure into x¯1 =
5.25, x¯2 = 10, x¯3 = 25 and x¯4 = 50 m3 per connection per month.
2. Block changes which are budget neutral for the water company.
(a) Decrease p1 with 15%, increase p2 and p3 with 84.6% and do not change p4
and p5.
(b) Introduce a progressive block price system with p1 = 1.36, p2 = 1.945, p3 =
2.60, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3.
(c) Introduce a flat price system with p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5 = 1.511 Real/m3.
(d) Decrease p1 with 15% only for the consumers of income Quintile 1, 2 and 3,
increase p2 and p3 with 58.77% for all consumers and do not change p4 and p5.
The results of the scenario analysis shows some interesting patterns even though welfare
effects are, as expected, small. The reader is reminded that a positive value for the equivalent
variation represents a welfare increase whereas a negative value represents a welfare decrease.
Note, furthermore, that the pattern of the results as described below is similar if the short
run demand function were applied. For all sub-scenarios of Scenario 1, the effect of the
policy change results in a zero welfare effect for the consumers in Quintile 3. The changes
in demand, average price, water bill and compensating variation differ substantially between
the different income groups. For example, if in Scenario 1a the price of the first block is
reduced by 15% and the second and third block price increase by 85%, demand and water
bills decrease, especially for the poor. On average, welfare slightly decreases (−5.19 Real),
but for the poor household welfare increases (+0.52 Real) whereas for the richest 40% of
the population welfare decreases (−3.43 and −23.53 Real, respectively). Moreover, in the
results, for some quintiles, equivalent variation increases, whereas demand decreases, which
seems to be counter intuitive. The main reason for the increase of EV is a reduction of the
average price due to which a higher equivalent income is needed to reach with the ex-ante
price system the ex-post utility level. The reason why demand decreases, even though the
average price falls, is that for this scenario the marginal price for the consumers increases
(p2 and p3 increase) but that due to the reduction of p1 the difference variable increases. The
10 It is recognized that many alternative scenarios of price change could be chosen. The scenarios chosen have
as objective to explore whether the MRSP could adopt a price system that is more pro-poor without affecting
to a too high extent total demand or total revenues for the water company.
123
Welfare and Distribution Effects of Water Pricing Policies 175
Table 3 Effects of changing block price structures on demand, average price, water bill and equivalent
variation for different income groups and effects on revenues collected by the water company for Scenario 1
Income quintile % Change in
water demand
Average
water price
(Real/m3)
% Change in
water bill
Equivalent
variation
(Real)
Scen. 1a: p1 −15%, p2 and p3 +85% and p4 and p5 +0%
1 −0.7 1.47 −1.9 0.52
2 −3.1 1.47 −4.2 0.55
3 −8.4 1.47 −9.2 0.00
4 −18.3 1.47 −18.7 −3.43
5 −0.1 1.90 19.6 −23.53
Average −5.7 1.61 0.08 −5.19
Scen. 1b: p1 = 1, p2 = 1.945, p3 = 2.6, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3
1 −16.3 1.38 −21.9 2.41
2 −13.2 1.42 −17.1 1.34
3 −12.1 1.45 −13.7 0.00
4 −18.3 1.47 −18.4 −3.66
5 −12.5 1.96 7.8 −33.19
Average −14.3 1.60 −9.6 −6.63
Scen. 1c: p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5 = 1.481 Real/m3
1 −4.8 1.48 −5.1 0.23
2 −2.1 1.48 −2.3 0.13
3 −1.1 1.48 −1.1 0.00
4 −1.0 1.48 −0.6 −0.27
5 7.3 1.48 0.2 9.49
Average 0.7 1.48 −1.41 1.92
Scen. 1d: p1 −15 for Quintile 1, 2 and 3; p2 and p3 +85% and p4 and p5 +0% for all
1 −0.7 1.47 −1.9 0.52
2 −3.1 1.47 −4.23 0.55
3 −8.4 1.47 −9.23 0.00
4 −18.3 1.66 −8.09 −11.09
5 −0.1 2.00 25.99 −31.20
Average −5.7 1.67 4.14 −8.26
Scen. 1e: Block structure x¯1 = 5.25, x¯2 = 10, x¯3 = 25, x¯4 = 50
1 −3.6 1.49 −3.5 0.00
2 −0.9 1.48 −0.9 0.00
3 0.0 1.48 0.0 0.00
4 −0.7 1.48 −0.7 0.19
5 0.0 1.67 5.1 −6.10
Average −0.9 1.54 0.8 −1.18
Entries in bold are the percentage change of the revenues collected by the water company. Percentage changes
are compared with the base results as presented in Table 2
demand effect of an increase of the marginal price is much stronger than the income effect
of an increase of the difference variable.
Next, if in Scenario 1b the price system is changed into a progressive block price system,
the average welfare reduction is larger, especially so because of a larger negative welfare
effect for the richest households. Moreover, welfare effects for the poorest are higher than
in the other sub-scenarios. It is especially the larger reduction of the first block price which
has a large effect on welfare for the poor as these fixed costs are such a large part of their
water bill, especially compared to the situation for the richer groups. For this scenario,
demand decreases as, like in Scenario 1a, the prices of the second till the fifth block increase.
A positive effect is the large reduction of the water bill for the poorer consumers which is
partly caused by a substantial reduction in demand. A drawback is, however, the reduction
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Table 4 Effects of changing block price structures on demand, average price, water bill and equivalent
variation for different income groups and effects on revenues collected by the water company for Scenario 2
Income quintile % Change in
water demand
Average
water price
(Real/m3)
% Change in
water bill
Equivalent
variation
(Real)
Scen. 2a: p1 −15%, p2 and p3 +84.58% and p4 and p5 +0%
1 −0.7 1.47 −1.9 0.56
2 −3.1 1.47 −4.3 0.59
3 −8.4 1.47 −9.3 −0.04
4 −18.3 1.47 −18.8 −3.39
5 −0.1 1.90 19.5 −23.38
Average −5.7% 1.60 0.0 −5.13
Scen. 2b: p1 = 1.365, p2 = 1.945, p3 = 2.6, p4 = 3 and p5 = 4 Real/m3
1 −16.3 1.60 −9.8 −4.86
2 −13.3 1.62 −5.2 −5.93
3 −12.1 1.64 −2.5 −7.34
4 −18.3 1.65 −8.3 −10.92
5 −12.6 2.07 13.9 −40.45
Average −14.3 1.77 0.0 −13.90
Scen. 2c: p1 = p2 =p3 = p4 = p5 = 1.5112 Real/m3
1 −5.6 1.51 −3.9 −0.92
2 −2.8 1.51 −1.0 −1.08
3 −1.8 1.51 0.2 −1.30
4 −1.6 1.51 0.8 −1.72
5 6.9 1.51 1.9 7.04
Average 0.1 1.51 0.0 0.40
Scen. 2d: p1 −15 for Quintile 1, 2 and 3; p2 and p3 +58.77% and p4 and p5 +10% for all
1 −0.7 1.41 −5.5 2.66
2 −3.1 1.41 −7.7 2.69
3 −8.4 1.41 −12.5 2.06
4 −16.0 1.62 −7.5 −8.81
5 −0.0 1.87 18.0 −21.57
Average −5.2 1.60 0.0 −4.60
Entries in bold are the percentage change of the revenues collected by the water company. Percentage changes
are compared with the base results as presented in Table 2
in revenues earned by the water company, which decreases by 9.6%. This reduction may,
especially, cause problems in the quality of the water services provided. For this scenario,
average prices increase stepwise with income.
In contrast, the flat price system presented in Scenario 1c does result on average in a
welfare increase, but especially so for the richer households. Effects on welfare for the poor
are small. Even though demand slightly decreases for the poor, welfare slightly increases as
average prices decrease.
In Scenario 1d, in which the price of the first block only decreases for the consumers from
Quintile 1, 2 and 3, on average welfare decreases. The welfare increases for consumers from
the poorest three quintiles are small and, of course, similar to those of Scenario 1a. Effects are
worse for consumers from Quintile 4 and 5. For this scenario, average prices for the different
income groups show a stepwise increase and the poorest benefit somewhat, but at the expense
of welfare for the richest consumers. The richest consumers, in fact, compensate the water
company for the subsidies given to the poor. Such an income dependent price system is more
favorable for the poor than for the rich. As the effects for the poor are so small, one can
wonder whether such a system is politically feasible and whether the administrative costs are
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not exceeding the equity gains. Note that an income dependent reduction of the fixed costs,
closely corresponds to an income transfer to the poorer consumers.
Finally, a change in the block structure as proposed in Scenario 1e, does not result in any
significant changes for the poor. In order to keep the median consumer at the same utility
level, the change in block sizes should be such that a reduction in expenses due to the decrease
of x¯1, is compensated by an increase of expenses due to an increase of the size of block 3
(i.e. by reducing x¯2), in which consumption is located. As consumers of Quintile 1 to 3 are all
in consumption block 3, they are all affected in the same way. As a result also revenues from
the water company will be almost unaffected. For consumers in Quintile 4 and 5, the welfare
effect additionally depends on the change of the frontier of block 3 (x¯4). If x¯4 decreases by
a large enough quantity, demand for both groups will be in block 4 and EV will decline as a
larger part of consumption will be consumed at a higher price. If the block frontier increases,
the reverse will happen.
Summarizing, these results show that specifically considering the welfare effects for dif-
ferent income groups gives more insight in the effects of price changes than just considering
the average welfare effects. The average effect of a price change may be positive, and the-
refore appealing to decision makers, but its individual effects for particular groups may be
the opposite. Moreover, a system that treats consumers more equally (e.g. a flat price sys-
tem) will result in general in higher average welfare whereas the more pro-poor systems
are detrimental for average welfare. The results, however, show that the reverse is true for
welfare effects for the poor. It should be noted that the welfare effects of the price changes
proposed here are relatively small. The flat price system, which will result in the highest ave-
rage welfare change, only has a marginal effect on welfare for the majority of the consumers
compared to the benchmark, except for the rich. Note that a change from a progressive to a
flat price system will have larger effects (the change from Scenario 1b to 1c will result in an
average welfare increase of 8.55 Real, but a reduction of welfare for the first two quintiles of
2.18 and 1.21 Real, respectively; welfare of the richest group will increase with 40.67 Real).
Moreover, a drawback of the pro-poor price systems, is that revenues collected by the water
company may decrease, which might endanger the financial viability of the water services
provision and therefore have important indirect welfare effects. This might be prevented by
introducing an income dependent system, but at the expense of the rich.
Next, Scenario 2 compares four different block price systems for which the effects on the
revenues for the water company are negligible. Changing the block sizes without affecting
the revenues is also possible, but will not be further considered here. Scenario 2a shows that
a reduction of the first block price by 15% and an increase of the second and third block price
by 84.6%, will result in a welfare reduction (−5.13 Real) which is negative for the richer
consumers and which is substantial for the richest quintile (−23.38 Real). Their water bill
increases, whereas the bill for the poorer consumers decreases.
Scenario 2b shows that welfare effects are worse for all consumers if a progressive price
system is introduced. Compared to Scenario 1b, in order to reach budget neutrality, p1 has
to increase as well. Only increasing p2 will not result in a budget neutral price change. This
has a considerable effect on water demand and individual welfare for all consumers. It is
an interesting observation that combining the objective of having a pro-poor price system
with the objective of revenue neutrality for the water company is difficult even though the
progressive price system is said to be pro-poor. In order to reach revenue neutrality p2 and
p3 have to increase to such an extent that the positive welfare effects of decreasing p1 are
nullified.
The results of Scenario 2c show that even though average welfare increases, only the
rich benefit from a budget neutral shift to a flat price system. Their welfare increases with
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7.04 Real. Welfare and demand for the poor decline. Finally, for the income dependent price
system (Scenario 2d), a budget neutral price change results in a positive welfare effect for the
poor. It has a negative average welfare effect (−4.60 Real) and a negative effect on welfare
for the rich (−21.57 Real). The poor benefit (+2.66 Real) as their fixed fees (price p1) are
reduced.
In summary, these results show that there is a trade off between a more equitable price
system that is welfare increasing for the poor and revenues collected by the water company.
Reaching both objectives with changes in the price system is difficult or even infeasible
and alternative policies will be needed which can either be subsidizing the water company
or financially supporting the poorer households through other price or income measures.
Note that the results only give the partial equilibrium effects of price changes. A decrease in
financial viability of the water company will negatively affect a welfare increase of individual
consumers and a subsidy to either the water company or the poorer consumers has to be
financed in one way or the other. Finally, changing the current price system into a flat price
system which leaves the revenues for the water company unaffected results, like in Scenario 1,
in a price system which on average is welfare improving but at the expense of the poor.
Finally, social welfare levels for the different scenarios are discussed. The Atkinson social
welfare measure as discussed in (14) gives an aggregate welfare measure which takes into
account inequality aversion. The higher inequality aversion, the more emphasis will be put
on the welfare effects for the lower income groups. The results in Table 5 show, as can be
expected, that the difference in social welfare between the different scenarios are small. Water
expenses are on average about 0.83% of total income (see Table 2) and as a consequence,
a small change in water prices only result in a small change in equivalent income. If no or
little account is given to inequality (for ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.5), a flat price (Scenario 1c and 2c)
gives the highest level of social welfare. This scenario is also the only scenario considered
that results in a positive average equivalent variation. If more account is given to inequality,
Scenario 1b and 2d, become slightly better for social welfare. Even though average equivalent
variation is negative and even though equivalent variation for the higher income groups does
decrease, social welfare increases more than in the other scenarios. If no account is given to
budget neutrality, the negative effects of an income dependent system (Scenario 1d) on the
rich make that a progressive price system (Scenario 1b) scores better. If budget neutrality is
considered, jointly with a reduction of the fixed fee, an income dependent system is more
advantageous for the richer households. Due to the skewed income distribution in the MRSP,
Table 5 Percentage changes in social welfare for the different price scenarios for different levels of inequality
aversion
Scenario ρ = 0 (%) ρ = 0.5 (%) ρ = 1 (%) ρ = 1.5 (%) ρ = 2 (%)
Scen. 1a −0.058 −0.019 −0.0015 0.0036 0.021
Scen. 1b −0.074 −0.018 0.0018 0.032 0.10
Scen. 1c 0.021 0.0075 0.0012 0.0048 0.011
Scen. 1d −0.092 −0.035 −0.0045 −0.0044 0.012
Scen. 1e −0.013 −0.0041 −0.00044 −0.00061 −0.00028
Scen. 2a −0.057 −0.018 −0.0014 0.0044 0.022
Scen. 2b −0.16 −0.089 −0.025 −0.13 −0.29
Scen. 2c 0.0045 −0.0055 −0.0033 −0.021 −0.053
Scen. 2d −0.051 −0.0084 0.0041 0.043 0.13
Percentage changes are compared to the base level of social welfare. Figures in bold give the subscenarios
yielding the highest level of social welfare
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already for low levels of ρ, the more pro-poor price systems give a higher level of social
welfare than the flat price system. The social welfare indicator confirms the results already
given above that there is a trade off between income distribution and welfare. The more
account is given to inequality, the more pro-poor pricing schemes should be. Due to the very
small differences in social welfare between the different scenarios, however, a final choice
on the optimal price system needs a more in depth analysis of the transaction costs of the
different systems and of the indirect welfare effects of cross subsidization through pricing
systems and requires a political choice on inequality aversion.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the welfare and distribution effects of changes in block price systems are
evaluated. A methodology is discussed with which equivalent variation can be determined
in case of a block price system for a linear demand function. Due to the increasing attention
paid to the need for water pricing and the effects of this on the poor, more insights in the
individual and aggregate welfare effects of these changes are necessary. This paper shows
that determining the exact welfare effects of changes in block price systems with equivalent
variation is possible on the basis of the Marshallian demand function and that it is not much
more difficult than determining the less exact measure of consumer surplus.
The methodology has been applied to evaluate welfare and distribution effects of resi-
dential water demand in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. Currently, the main water
company in the MRSP applies a five-tiered block price system in which the prices in the
second till the fifth blocks increase stepwise and in which the price in the first consumption
block is higher than the price in the fifth block. Using aggregate, monthly data on consump-
tion, prices, income, rainfall, temperature, rationing and population for the period July 1997
to December 2002, a linear demand function has been estimated. Price and income elastici-
ties for the short run demand function are −0.20 and 0.19, respectively, and for the long run
demand function −0.28 and 0.28, respectively. The inelasticity shows that it is difficult to
reach a substantial reduction of demand, especially for the richer consumers and even in the
longer run, by using only pricing policies. Additional policies will be needed to make people
more aware of the water scarcity problems in urban areas.
Using the demand function, the effects of a number of scenarios of alternative price systems
are evaluated for five income groups. The results show that although the average water price
for the richer households is higher than for the poorer, water bills for the poor are a substantial
part of their income whereas they are very small for the rich. The scenario analysis shows
that, as can be expected, a flat price system is better for the rich and a progressive block price
system is in general better for the poor. Moreover, if no account is given to inequality, social
welfare is highest in a flat price system. If inequality aversion increases, pro-poor systems and
income dependent systems, result in higher social welfare. The individual welfare effects,
however, are only marginal. As a result no major income distribution changes can be reached
in the MRSP if the water pricing system would be turned into a more pro-poor system.
Furthermore, one can question whether the transaction costs of the administrative system
necessary for an income dependent or pro-poor price system do not outweigh the welfare
gains. An additional analysis of these transaction costs would be required for answering this
question. Finally, there is a trade off between the financial situation of the water company and
a more equitable price system that is welfare increasing for the poor. Compared to the current
price system, a progressive block price system that does not affect the revenues collected by
the water company, results in a welfare loss for all.
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Although price systems that consider income distribution may not be as good for average
welfare as flat price systems, their direct effects on poverty and social welfare should not be
neglected and are worthwhile to look at. The information obtained with the method discussed
here is valuable for making deliberate choices on the most appropriate pricing policies and
gives policy makers important information they would not have if only demand functions
were known. As for the MRSP these effects turned out to be small, it can be questioned
whether it would not be better and cheaper to use other instruments than water price changes
to reach a situation in which consumption by the rich is treated differently than consumption
by the poor.
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Appendix: Derivation of Utility Level u1
The definition of indirect utility shows that in case of a flat price p and budget y, utility is
equal to u = V (p, y), see (4). In case of a kinked budget curve, the exact definition depends
on the segment on which demand xeis located, see also Figs. 1–3, and see also the discussion
on eb( pb, u1).
From this it follows that:
• if xe = x
(
p11, y0
)
< x¯ , then u1 = V
(
p11, y0
)
• if xe = x
(
p21, y0 +
(
p21 − p11
)
x¯
)
> x¯ , then u1 = V
(
p21, y0 +
(
p21 − p11
)
x¯
)
• else xe is at the kink (xe = x¯) and it can easily be seen that in case of a convex budget curve
u1 < V
(
p11, y0
)
and u1 < V
(
p21, y0 +
(
p21 − p11
)
x¯
)
. It can easily be seen from Fig. 3
that u1 = min p¯
{
V
(
p¯, y0 +
(
p¯ − p11
)
x¯
) ∣∣p11 ≤ p¯ ≤ p21 }. From (2) follows that ∂2V∂ p¯2 >
Fig. 3 Schematic representation of utility if demand x1 is at the kink of the budget curve
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0 and ∂V
∂ p¯ = 0 for p¯ =
[
x¯ − βy0 − γ z + βp11 x¯
]
/ (β x¯ + α). As y0 − p11 x¯ = y¯ − p¯x¯ , it
follows that y¯ = y0 +
(
p¯ − p11
)
x¯ , which gives all ingredients to derive u1 = V ( p¯, y¯).
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